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derstood.4	 This	 canon	 states	 that	 when	 a	 statute	 includes	 a	 list	 of	
terms	and	a	catch-all	phrase,	the	terms	in	the	list	are	limited	to	those	
that	are	consistent	with	the	catch-all	phrase.	To	put	it	another	way,	in	
a	 statutory	provision	 that	extends	 to	 “A,	B,	C,	and	any	other	Z,”	 the	
canon	of	reverse	ejusdem	generis	would	advise	that	only	those	As,	Bs,	










































it),	when	 the	 canon	 is	particularly	useful	 or	not,	 and	what	kinds	of	
questions	courts	ought	to	consider	when	deciding	whether	or	not	to	
apply	 the	canon	 in	any	specific	case.	 In	sum,	 I	argue	 that,	 like	most	
other	 canons	 of	 construction,	 the	 canon	 of	 reverse	 ejusdem	 generis	




ing	 issue	 related	 to	 the	 canon	 has	 to	 do	with	 the	 generality	 of	 the	
catch-all	term	or	phrase.	When	the	catch-all	term	is	quite	precise,	the	
inference	 that	 the	 legislature	 intended	 the	enumerated	 terms	 to	be	
subject	to	the	catch-all’s	limits	will	be	rather	strong.	When	the	catch-





cases	 addressing	 the	 reverse	ejusdem	generis	 canon.	 Some	 of	 these	





described	 in	Part	 I.	 In	Part	 III,	 the	Article	 turns	 to	 consider	 the	Su-








































































gested	 interpretation	 of	 the	 statute.14	 In	 the	 defendants’	 favor,	 the	













racy;	 there	 could	be	no	other	motive	 for	 specifying	 them.	The	 subsequent	
words	 do	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 employed	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 limiting	 piratical	
murder	and	robbery	.	.	.	but	for	the	purpose	of	adding	other	offences,	should	
there	be	any,	which	were	not	particularly	recited,	and	which	were	rendered	

























In	 dissent,	 Justice	 Johnson	 began	 with	 two	 basic,	 big-picture	
points:	 that	 laws	 imposing	 capital	 punishment	 should	 be	 imposed	
only	when	a	statute	is	absolutely	clear,18	and	that	the	purpose	of	the	
piracy	law	was	to	ensure	uniformity	between	how	laws	would	apply	











































the	question	of	whether	 the	manufacture,	 sale,	or	 transportation	of	
non-intoxicating	malt	beverages	constituted	a	violation	of	state	and	lo-
cal	 intoxicating	 liquor	 statutes.	The	 statutes	 in	 these	 cases	were	all	
slightly	different	from	each	other,	but	I	think	it’s	fair	to	suggest	that	on	

















terpretation,	 and	 occasionally	 the	 courts	 specifically	 reject	 the	 ap-














































jected	 this	 analysis	 in	 reaching	 a	 different	 interpretation	 of	 a	 state	








that	 doctrine	will	manifestly	 lead	 to	 the	 upholding	 of	 all	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 law	
agreeably	to	the	evident	legislative	design	at	the	bottom	of	its	enactment.”	Id.	In	the	
elided	portion	of	the	quotation	following	the	first	mention	of	ejusdem	generis,	the	court	
quoted	 two	 correct	 definitions	 of	 the	 regular	 ejusdem	 generis	 canon,	 including	 one	
from	Lord	Tenterden,	which	states,		
Where	a	statute	or	other	document	enumerates	several	classes	of	persons	or	
things,	 and	 immediately	 following	 and	 classed	with	 such	 enumeration	 the	
clause	embraces	“other”	persons	or	things,	the	word	“other”	will	generally	be	
read	as	“other	such	like,”	so	that	persons	or	things	therein	comprised	may	be	












ties	 .	.	.	.”34	 The	Washington	 court	 discussed	Strickler	 and	noted	 the	
California	court’s	argument	that	only	an	interpretation	of	the	Califor-
nia	statute	that	excluded	non-alcoholic	liquors	could	explain	the	use	




far	 from	conclusive	 to	us.	.	.	.	The	general	words,	 ‘or	other	 intoxicating	 liq-
uors,’	were	intended	to	add	to	the	things	theretofore	specifically	enumerated,	
not	to	take	away	from	or	limit	what	had	already	been	included.36	


































enterprise”	 under	 21	 U.S.C.	 §	 848(c)(2).	 That	 statute	 requires	 the	
prosecution	to	prove,	as	an	element	of	the	crime	(typically	a	drug	re-
lated	 offense),	 that	 the	 defendant	 acted:	 “[I]n	 concert	 with	 five	 or	
more	other	persons	with	respect	to	whom	such	person	occupies	a	po-
sition	of	 organizer,	 a	 supervisory	position,	 or	 any	other	position	of	
management	.	.	.	.”39	The	question	raised	by	the	reverse	ejusdem	gene-


































































Quoting	this	paragraph	in	 full,	a	 two	 judge	majority	on	a	Ninth	
Circuit	panel	relied	on	the	Jerome	court’s	interpretation	of	the	statute	
two	years	later	to	reverse	a	defendant’s	conviction	on	the	basis	that	
















































erence	 in	 [the	CCE	statute]	 to	an	“organizer”	or	a	holder	of	a	 “supervisory	
position”	requires	some	sort	of	managerial	capacity.51	








































added).	 Thus	 Congress	 evidently	 viewed	 the	 four	 specified	 classes	 as	
 
	 53.	 Dong	v.	Smithsonian	Inst.,	125	F.3d	877,	877	(D.C.	Cir.	1997).	The	facts	of	the	
case	were	 quite	 interesting.	Margaret	 Dong	worked	 at	 the	Hirshhorn	Museum	 and	
Sculpture	Garden	in	Washington,	D.C.,	where	part	of	her	job	was	to	accompany	works	
of	 art	 that	 the	Hirshhorn	 lent	 to	 other	museums.	 Id.	 In	 1993,	Dong	 accompanied	 a	
painting	 called	 “Circus	Horse”	 to	 the	Museum	of	Modern	Art	 (MOMA)	 in	New	York	



















ons	of	construction	 it	might	be	 termed	an	application	of	 “reverse	ejusdem	



























	 58.	 Id.	 (quoting	United	States	v.	Williams-Davis,	90	F.3d	490,	508–09	(D.C.	Cir.	
1996)).	

























In	 addition	 to	 these	 cases	 involving	 statutory	 interpretation,	 a	
handful	of	cases	employ	the	reverse	ejusdem	generis	canon	in	the	con-
text	of	interpreting	contracts,	typically	insurance	contracts.67	Illustra-











the	 inception	of	 this	Certificate.”69	According	 to	 the	 insurance	com-
pany,	the	clause	excluded	damage	caused	by	any	sort	of	leak,	regard-
less	 of	whether	 the	 leak	was	 sudden	 or	 gradual.70	 In	 response,	 the	
management	corporation	argued	 for	an	 interpretation	of	 the	clause	
informed	 by	 the	 reverse	 ejusdem	 generis	 canon,	 claiming	 that	 the	





































the	 insurance	 company	 based	 on	 the	 company’s	 semicolon	 argu-
ment.75	




aging	 products	 filed	 an	 insurance	 claim	 to	 recover	 losses	 resulting	
 
	 71.	 Id.	at	624–25.	


























icy’s	 relevant	 clause,	 that	 only	 corrosion	occurring	 “inevitably	 over	
the	 useful	 life	 of	 the	machine”	 was	 excluded	 from	 coverage.78	 The	
clause	provided	 that	 “[the	manufacturer	would]	not	pay	 for	 loss	or	
damage	resulting	from	any	of	the	following	.	.	.	Deterioration,	deple-






obscure	 canon	of	 construction,	 ‘reverse	ejusdem	generis,’”	 the	 court	

































like	 judicial	 precedents,	 but	 rather	 are	 starting	 points	 or	 presump-
tions	 for	 thinking	 about	 how	 to	 read	 a	 statutory	 provision.	 In	 any	
given	case,	the	context	of	the	statutory	provision	or	the	legislative	his-
tory	or	simply	common	sense	may	make	application	of	an	otherwise	
applicable	 canon	of	 construction	 inapplicable.	Nonetheless,	 lawyers	
(and	law	students)	need	to	be	aware	of	these	canons	and	be	able	to	
use	them	to	argue	in	favor	of	whatever	interpretation	of	a	statute	will	






























are	many	practical	 tools	of	 interpretation	 that	you	will	have	 to	master	 to	become	a	











































fruit,	 fodder,	 farm	produce,	 insecticides,	pumps,	nails,	 tools,	and	wagons.”	Id.	 (citing	
Heatherton	Coop.	Co.	v.	Grant	(1929),	[1930]	1	D.L.R.	975	(Can.	N.S.	S.C.)).	


















































terpretation:	 Interpretive	Canon	Use	 in	 the	Roberts	Court’s	First	Decade,	117	MICH.	L.	












A	 few	of	 rules	of	 thumb	regarding	 the	 reverse	ejusdem	generis	
canon,	 though,	do	seem	on	 fairly	sure	 footing.	For	one	 thing,	as	 the	














fruits,”	 and	one	 that	 extends	 to	 “all	 red	 fruits,	 including	apples	and	
cherries.”	The	latter,	just	as	the	former,	could	easily	be	read	to	exclude	
green	apples.	Indeed,	in	Massachusetts	v.	EPA,	which	will	be	discussed	
































rence,	 Olathe,	 Wichita,	 Overland	 Park,	 and	 other	 cities	 in	 Kansas.”	
Which	of	the	two	statutes	is	more	easily	read	to	exclude	Kansas	City,	
Missouri?	 Not	 that	 the	 question	 is	 necessarily	 a	 slam	 dunk—some	
other	contextual	clue	or	piece	of	legislative	history	or	the	like	might	













long	 and	 slender	 foods,	 or	 all	 foods—it’s	 impossible	 to	 tell.	 On	 the	
other	hand,	with	reverse	ejusdem	generis,	the	principle	that	the	reader	
can	infer	limits	on	the	enumerated	items	from	the	nature	of	the	catch-
































principle	would	 seem	 to	have	 some	 force	 in	 the	 intoxicating	 liquor	
context.100	Did	state	legislators	seeking	to	prohibit	the	sale	of	“spirit-
uous,	vinous,	or	malt	liquors,	or	any	other	intoxicating	liquors”	intend	





by	referring	 to	 “intoxicating	 liquors”	 in	 the	catch-all.	 Since	 it	 seems	
highly	likely	that	the	legislators	were	aware	of	the	existence	of	non-
intoxicating	malt	 beverages,	 then	 it	would	 seem	 that	 the	 California	







































describe	 iguanas,	 tortoises,	 and	 rattlesnakes	 and	 didn’t	 know	what	
other	phrase	to	use	(assume	they	really,	really	didn’t	want	to	cover	








criminal	 enterprise	 statute	 that	was	 the	 subject	 of	 the	Apodaca,	 Je-
rome,	Delgado,	 and	Williams-Davis	 cases.	Recall	 that	 the	 statute	 ap-
plies	to	defendants	who	act	“in	concert	with	five	or	more	other	per-
sons	 with	 respect	 to	 whom	 such	 person	 occupies	 a	 position	 of	
organizer,	 a	 supervisory	position,	or	any	other	position	of	manage-
ment.”104	The	question	 is	whether	 the	statute	should	be	read	to	ex-
clude	 organizers	 or	 supervisors	 who	 do	 not	 have	 a	 managerial	
 









rial	 position.105	 Perhaps	 the	 phrase	 “position	 of	management”	 was	
simply	 chosen	 as	 a	 phrase	 that	would	 seem	 to	 accurately	 describe	
what	organizers	and	supervisors	have	 in	common.	 If	 the	phrase	 in-
stead	was	something	like	“any	other	position	in	which	the	person	can	
give	orders	and	expect	them	to	be	followed	by	everybody	in	the	enter-
prise,”	 then	 it	would	 be	 clear	 that	 organizers	 and	 supervisors	who	














































the	 government	 argued	 should	 be	 read	 according	 to	 the	 reverse	
ejusdem	generis	 canon,110	 although	 the	government	did	not	actually	















vehicles	 or	 new	 motor	 vehicle	 engines,	 which	 in	 his	 judgment	 cause,	 or	
 






	 109.	 Massachussets	 v.	 EPA,	549	U.S.	 at	528.	The	other	major	 issues	 in	 the	 case,	




























































































gram	was	 “fundamentally	 ill-suited”	 to	 addressing	 global	 climate	 change,	 Congress	





atmosphere	around	 the	globe.	 Id.	 (“The	 statutory	NAAQS	 implementation	 regime	 is	









statute	 and	 relies	 on	 a	 reverse	 ejusdem	 generis	 argument	 without	




































cant	memo	 “as	 the	position	of	 the	Agency	 for	purposes	of	 deciding	
th[e]	petition	and	for	all	other	relevant	purposes	under	the	CAA.”125	











does	not	 authorize	 regulation	 to	 address	 concerns	about	 global	 cli-
mate	change.”126	Like	the	Fabricant	memo,	EPA’s	notice	explained	that	
its	 interpretation	 of	 section	 302(g)	 “follow[ed]	 from	 this	 conclu-
sion.”127	 The	agency	 then	 reiterated	verbatim	 the	passage	 from	 the	

















sent,	 addressed	 the	 statutory	 question,	 and	 for	 him,	 the	 issue	was	
straightforward	 and	 seemingly	 quite	 easy.	 Quoting	 section	 302(g),	
Tatel	 concluded	 that,	 “[t]his	exceedingly	broad	 language	plainly	 co-
vers	 GHGs	 emitted	 from	 motor	 vehicles:	 they	 are	 ‘physical	 [and]	


























The	 agency’s	 interpretation,	 in	 other	 words,	 failed	 Chevron	 step-
one.135	
In	the	rest	of	his	discussion	of	the	statutory	interpretation	issue,	
































	 139.	 In	 his	 fascinating	 new	 book	 about	 the	Massachusetts	 v.	 EPA	litigation,	 Har-
vard’s	Richard	Lazarus	provides	some	insight	into	how	various	actors	viewed	the	stat-
utory	interpretation	issue	as	it	worked	its	way	through	the	EPA	and	the	courts.	See,	




















relevant	provisions	of	 the	Clean	Air	Act	with	arguments	based	on	 the	 lan-













































of	 ‘air	 pollutant’	 .	.	.	 embraces	 all	 airborne	 compounds	 of	whatever	
stripe,	and	underscores	 that	 intent	 through	 the	repeated	use	of	 the	
word	‘any.’	.	.	.	The	statute	is	unambiguous.”144	
In	dissent,	 Justice	Scalia	argued	that	the	majority’s	approach	to	















ment	provides	 a	 helpful	 (and	unanswered)	 example:	 [reciting	 the	 govern-
ment’s	“any	American	automobile”	example]	The	general	principle	enunci-

























As	 this	 lengthy	 account	demonstrates,	 the	EPA,	 the	 Justice	De-
partment,	and	four	Justices	of	the	Supreme	Court	all	argued	consist-
ently	that	section	302(g)	of	the	Clean	Air	Act	was	subject	to	a	reverse	


























	 147.	 Massachusetts	v.	EPA,	549	U.S.	at	556–58.	 Justice	Scalia	went	on	to	explain	
why	 it	was	 reasonable	under	Chevron	 step-two	 for	 the	EPA	 to	have	 concluded	 that	










ments	 about	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 statute.	 Although	 Justice	 Stevens	











































curring	 interpretive	 issue,	 the	 government	 was	 unable	 to	 take	 ad-
vantage	of	prior	cases	presenting	real	world	examples	of	the	reverse	
ejusdem	generis	canon	and	therefore	was	forced	to	craft	its	own	exam-











application	 of	 the	 reverse	 ejusdem	 generis	 canon	 than	 section	
302(g)—features	that	correspond	to	points	four	and	five	described	in	
Part	II	of	the	Article.152	First,	it	is	much	more	generally	known	in	the	
hypothetical	 that	 the	enumerated	 items	contain	 subsets	 that	would	
not	be	covered	if	limited	by	the	catch-all	than	it	is	in	section	302(g).	
Everybody	knows	that	there	are	trucks	and	minivans	in	the	world	that	
are	 not	 American.	 But	 it’s	 far	 from	 clear	 that	 there	 are	 necessarily	
physical,	chemical,	biological,	or	radioactive	substances	that	enter	the	
ambient	air	but	that	are	not	“air	pollution	agents.”	This	point	is	related	
to	 the	second	point	 that	 the	phrase	 “American	automobile”	 is	more	
precise	than	the	phrase	“air	pollution	agent.”	Everyone	knows	what	





might	 have	 led	 it	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	 government’s	 argument	was	
particularly	weak.	Readers	of	the	opinion,	too,	are	likely	to	at	least	in-















utes	 subject	 to	 reverse	ejusdem	generis	 interpretations,	 the	govern-
ment	left	the	Court	with	no	real-world	examples	against	which	it	could	









manner.	 In	 turn,	 this	might	have	 led	 them	 to	 consider	whether	 the	
phrase	“air	pollution	agent”	is	a	sufficiently	precise	term	best	read	to	
limit	the	list	of	enumerated	items	or	whether	instead	it	 is	a	general	




































ness	of	 the	government’s	argument.	This	 is	 emphatically	not	 to	 say	











canon	entry	 into	 the	 canon.	 It	 should	be	discussed	 in	 casebooks,	 in	
treatises,	 in	 law	school	courses,	 in	briefs,	and	 in	cases.	 It	 should	be	
called	by	its	name	and	treated	with	respect.	In	short:	Long	live	reverse	
ejusdem	generis!154	
 
	 154.	 I	would	have	translated	this	sentence	fully	into	Latin	but	I	don’t	know	how,	
and	I	don’t	trust	Google	Translate.	
